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Goebbels welcomed the invasion of Normandy. He saw it as an opportunity to infl ict a decisive defeat on the Western Allies, and open the way towards an end to Germany's war on two fronts. He still had huge faith in Rommel, who was commanding the forces around the Allied beachhead, and hoped that within two or three days he would deploy suffi cient armoured reserves to drive the Allies back into the sea. He was rapidly disappointed. The overwhelming Allied air supremacy made it almost impossible for Rommel to move his reserves, or to attack effectively with those he could get in place. Goebbels was similarly disappointed with the long-postponed use of the 'vengeance weapons'. The fl ying bombs (soon called the V1, at Goebbels' suggestion) were launched against London on 15 June, and over the next few weeks a sustained offensive was maintained against the British capital. Goebbels had built up great expectations in the German press about the impact the 'vengeance weapons' might have, and he was hugely frustrated by the British tactic of keeping silent about their effects. Lacking any detailed intelligence, Goebbels was only able to speculate, largely on the basis of rumours, about this, and he quickly realized that, whatever damage 276 T. Thacker, Joseph Goebbels © Toby Thacker 2009 'How Distant and Alien this Beautiful World Appears' 277 the V1s were causing in London, they were not bringing the British to their knees. As early as 18 June he moved to tone down the 'sometimes grotesque' exaggeration about them in the German press. At the same time he admitted that there could be no German counter-offensive in Normandy because of Allied air superiority.
2
These concerns were soon overwhelmed by Goebbels' gradual realization of the danger posed by the renewed Soviet offensive in the centre of the Eastern Front. Although the start of this long-planned offensive was timed for the anniversary of Operation Barbarossa on 22 June, it took several days to develop in full strength, and for the scale of its success to become apparent in Berlin. On 26 June Goebbels dictated that 'as if from a clear sky comes the news that the Bolsheviks have achieved a breakthrough in great style '. 3 In fact the situation was far worse than he realized. The German Army Group Centre was totally overwhelmed; whole units surrendered with their commanders; towns bombastically imagined as 'fortresses' were abandoned, and the apparatus of German occupation collapsed. All who could fl ed, using any means of transport available, carrying what booty they could, but abandoning huge quantities of equipment and supplies. For the next six weeks Soviet armoured units and motorized infantry advanced swiftly across Belorussia, and into what had been eastern Poland. By mid-July refugees were streaming into East Prussia, and Soviet forces were close to the Baltic coast, threatening to cut off Army Group North. It was, according to a recent historian, 'the most crushing single defeat in the history of the German Army '. 4 Goebbels now realized the gravity of the situation; this was, he dictated: 'the end-phase of our historic fi ght for the Reich'.
5 But he sensed drift and defeatism at all levels of the German leadership. For the fi rst time in his diary in early July he had used the phrase 'if I were the Führer', 6 with all its implied criticism of Hitler. He was scathing about Göring and the total failure of the Luftwaffe; and he was disgusted by the willingness of generals and senior offi cers to lay down their arms. Nothing incensed him more than those captured offi cers who had joined the Soviet-sponsored 'Free Germany National Committee', and now broadcast on Soviet radio, appealing to German soldiers to give up the unequal struggle.
7 On 20 July, Goebbels was in the Propaganda Ministry with Speer and Funk, when at lunchtime he received a telephone call telling him that there had been an unsuccessful attempt to kill Hitler in Rastenburg.
Goebbels did not dictate an entry for 20 July, or the following day in his diary, but we do have accounts from both Speer and Oven, who were with him on that critical day, and in a broadcast speech on 26 July Goebbels gave his own résumé of events.
8 Although Kershaw suggests that Goebbels initially procrastinated, wanting 'to hedge his bets', 9 he acted with characteristic energy and resolution once he knew that the attempted assassination was part of a larger plot to replace the Nazi government. Goebbels' reaction appears all the more important when it is contrasted with the indecision of the conspirators gathered nearby in Ben-
